Monastery dispute stalls Azerbaijan-Georgia border demarcation

Talks on demarcating the border between Azerbaijan and Georgia have stalled again, according to officials at the Georgian foreign ministry. The main issue to be settled is the fate of a 6th century monastery complex which straddles the mutual border.

The demarcation process has been drawn out for years, despite the cordial relations between Baku and Tbilisi and their joint interest in facilitating greater cross-border ties. The old Soviet borders are currently used as a placeholder, whilst the Alazan river also forms a natural boundary along some of the 480km of their boundary.

According to Georgian officials, 160km still remains to be demarcated. The biggest issue is the fate of the David Gareja Monastery, known as the Keshish Dag in Azerbaijan, which sprawls across a mountain slope dividing the two countries – both sides claim that the bulk of the complex lies within their territory. The monastery was founded in the 6th century and is Georgian Orthodox, giving it great significance for modern Georgia.

For Azerbaijan the monastery is significant for two reasons. Firstly it is claimed to be the work of 'Caucasian Albanians', believed to be the ancient inhabitants of Azerbaijan and regularly used as a historical weapon in Azerbaijan's battle with Armenia over who has the 'right' to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Secondly and more prosaically, the site is viewed as a strategic height which Azerbaijan is reluctant to give away.

Although officials have downplayed the long-running dispute, public opinion is vociferously opposed to any compromise. The rest of the border can probably be delimited without much controversy, but it remains to be seen whether a compromise can be struck over the fate of the monastery.

The lack of a demarcated border has not been much of an impediment to relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are close and based on extensive energy and infrastructure projects. Given nationalist sensibilities in both countries, however, sacrificing anything believed to be an integral part of national history would be a major headache for the authorities. In the South Caucasus 'compromise' is often equated with 'surrender'.

It seems, therefore, that the commission working on border demarcation is simply seeking to put off the issue of the monastery complex for as long as possible. It has not stopped cooperation, and the ambivalence of the status quo seems to be a situation which everyone can live with, for now.

Sources: News.az, Institute for War and Peace Reporting

Iran, Russia oppose cross-border Caspian pipeline

Iran and Russia have both announced their opposition to a pipeline across the Caspian Sea, which was backed by the EU last week as a means to bring Caspian gas to Europe.

A trans-Caspian pipeline, running west from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan along the Caspian seabed, has been under discussion for years, but has never got off the ground due to a lack of commercial imperative and political will. An ongoing dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over their maritime border, and associated gas and oil fields, has also stymied progress.

On 13th September, however, the EU's Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger announced that the EU was would start negotiating a legally binding treaty between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to build a trans-Caspian pipeline. Europe, said Oettinger, “is now speaking with one voice” – previous efforts to coordinate the 'Southern Corridor' to bring Caspian gas to Europe have been hamstrung by competing European agendas and approaches. The new mandate will empower it to arrange the legal and commercial requirements of a trans-Caspian system.

The pipeline would enable Turkmen gas to reach Europe without crossing Russian or Iranian soil. The EU is keen to reduce its energy dependence on Russia and avoid politically problematic Iran, whilst Turkmenistan is looking to diversify its energy export routes.

Tehran and Moscow have reacted angrily to the EU's intervention. Iran has stated that it opposes the project on ecological and legal grounds. Russia expressed its regret, and warned that the project did not account for “the actually existing international legal and geopolitical situation in the Caspian Basin today”.

The reference to geopolitics is significant, as it indicates the main reason for Russian and Iranian opposition (notwithstanding ecological protestations) – that a Caspian pipeline would enable Central Asian gas to avoid their territory, reducing their political and commercial leverage.

The other objection is that the legal status of the Caspian Sea, including the littoral states' maritime boundaries, is still unclear. Although most of the states have simply got on with developing gas and oil fields in their presumed sectors, the exact boundaries and the right of states to undertake major projects – like a subsea pipeline – is still legally unclear.

It is likely that Russia and Iran will apply a range of legal and political pressures to stop the pipeline from going ahead. The EU's internal problems and lack of focus towards the Caspian region may make it an unreliable patron for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and unable to push the pipeline through against Russian and Iranian opposition.

Sources: Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Reuters

Azerbaijan criticises Armenia-Georgia ties

Georgia has found itself in a rather uncomfortable position recently, as its efforts to improve economic ties with Armenia have come under fire from Azerbaijan, Armenia's arch-rival but Georgia's strategic ally.

In a tough neighbourhood, Tbilisi needs all the friends it can get; as well as its close energy partnership with Azerbaijan, it has sought to cultivate ties with Armenia. Outreach to Yerevan is for its own merits, but also in order to draw Armenia away from its economic and strategic patron Russia. The hostility between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, therefore, requires a careful balance from Tbilisi.

For some time rumours have circulated that Tbilisi, as part of its privatisation drive, was seeking to sell off its section of a pipeline which sells Russian gas to Armenia (isolated by Azerbaijani and Turkish blockades, Armenia relies on Russian and Iranian gas). Fears arose in Armenia that Azerbaijan's state energy firm State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) would seek to acquire the pipeline, effectively giving it control of Armenia's gas supply.

This now seems unlikely, with Georgian officials insisting that the pipeline will remain in government hands. However, the battle of influence between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Georgia continues.

In mid-February Armenia and Georgia agreed to jointly operate their three border crossings in order to smooth travel and trade between them. Conflicting regulations have inhibited trade, partly explaining why Armenian president Serzh Sarkisian declared on 17th February that trade between them was “insufficient” despite the fact that total trade turnover more than doubled between 2005 and 2008.

One successfully developing area of integration has been a boom in Armenians holidaying on Georgia's Black Sea coast, buying property there, and setting up import/export businesses in Georgian ports. In 2010, around 300,000 Armenian tourists visited Georgia, according to Yerevan.

Responding to this rise in Armenian-Georgian contact, but without any discernible immediate trigger, Baku's ambassador to Tbilisi Namig Aliyev declared on 24th February that Armenia “means to occupy these territories [in Georgia] both through military way [sic] and migration.”

He said that Armenians working and living in Georgia were an attempt to create mono-ethnic enclaves in order to realise the concept of a 'Greater Armenia' stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and that Azerbaijan and Georgia must unite to prevent this “great threat.”

Exactly why the ambassador made these comments at this juncture is unclear: the Georgian government will take claims of colonisation with a large pinch of salt, especially given its recent efforts to improve cooperation with Armenia.

Ironically, given his denunciation of mono-ethnic areas in Georgia, the following day Ambassador Aliyev paid a visit to Marneuli – a Georgian district which is 83 per cent ethnically Azerbaijani.

Sources: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, News.az, Armenia Now

For more information, please see the Menas Borders website, here.