Fence erected on Georgia-South Ossetia border

The village of Dvani, located on the administrative border between Georgia and the newly autonomous region of South Ossetia and home to around 1,000 people, has seen a number of protests in recent weeks over the erection of boundary fences by Russian forces. Other villages, such as Ditsi and Didi Khurvaleti, have also been affected by the dividing fences, which locals say amounts to a 'creeping borderisation' across Georgian territory that was not originally agreed upon following the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. The news has received much attention as Georgia's presidential elections approach this Sunday.

According to EU monitors, around 40km of barbed wire fencing has been erected along the 400km border, supported by intermittent pylons fitted with hi-tech surveillance equipment. At some junctures, the fence intersects properties, contiguous farmland and historical sites, including cemeteries. The majority of the work has been completed by Russia's army, appointed by South Ossetia to protect its borders as it did not have an independent force of its own.

Georgia's Foreigh Minister Maia Panjikidze last month said that the this provocative boundary demarcation amounts to “the illegal action of the Russian occupying forces”, a position supported by the EU's High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, who has called on Russia to remove the fence. Moscow's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, has labelled T'bilisi's claims “propagandistic hysteria”, denying that Russian action violate international norms.

On 25 August 2008, Russia recognised the breakaway states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent after having supported local militant groups during the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, however, Georgia saw this as an annexation of its territory and formally cut all diplomatic ties with its northern neighbour. Ever since then, the boundary situation has been fluid and unsettled. Border outposts have been moved back and forth, and shooting incidents still occasionally occur. EU monitors have played a limited role in keeping the peace.

International reaction to violence on the Kosovo-Serbia border

After last week's clashes in northern Kosovo which left a Kosovan policeman dead and NATO/KFOR peacekeepers under fire, additional peacekeeping forces were sent to the region on Tuesday (2 August) to relieve those that had been involved since the start of the crisis. NATO has stressed that this does not represent a reaction to the escalation of the crisis which began when Kosovan police attempted to take over two border crossings, and ethnic Serbs subsequently attacked a border post on 28 July.

In addition, Kosovo has imposed a de facto trade embargo on Serbia. The timing, if not the nature, of this development is surprising for it has been three years since the Serbian government in Belgrade banned imports from Kosovo as a consequence of Pristina's unilateral declaration of independence.

The Belgrade government and the Serb minority in northern Kosovo have never recognised the independent government of Kosovo. On 31 July a declaration of the Serbian government criticised the actions of the authorities in Pristina. Since then, Belgrade has been sure to signal its commitment to the peaceful resolution of the present crisis through dialogue; President Tadic has stated that, in light of the recent history of the Balkans, that the preservation of regional stability is the priority.

Nonetheless, elements of the minority Serb population in northern Kosovo have perceived a provocation to violence in the activities of the Kosovan government. 60,000 Serbs live in the north; among this population there is little acceptance of the region's control by Pristina. Accordingly, the authorities there exercise little effective control in the north of the territory that is defined by their Republic's Constitution. With this, and an associated measure of pragmatism in mind, the international players that have recognised Kosovo's independence over the last three years have encouraged it to pursue an incremental strategy in this respect.

Nonetheless, recognising the more conciliatory and cooperative stance adopted by the present Belgrade government towards the international community, external actors have signalled their general disapproval of the Pristina's actions. The EU High Representative on foreign affairs, Catherine Ashton, indicated the EU's disapproval, and the US State Department criticised Pristina for not coordinating its actions with the international community. At the UN, the Secretary-General called for restraint and dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina facilitated by the EU. China—the only power to abstain at the formulation of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), which mandated the international presence in Serbia/Kosovo, and one which was highly critical of the NATO action in 1999—expressed its regret over the Pristina administration's activities which it blamed for the increasing tensions.

Internationally, then, there seems to exist the recognition that the present crisis has been brought on by the provocation of the Pristina government led by Hashim Thaci. This, however, will not affect the international community's line on Kosovo. The UN General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have emphasised the inviolability of Kosovo's territorial integrity since its independence, and this will continue to guide practice.

In 2010, in its advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that Pristina's declaration of independence in 2008 did not violate international law; eighty states including, crucially, most EU members have recognised the Republic of Kosovo. Pristina's challenge to the status quo has been heavily criticised by the international actors but, nonetheless, there is little that the Serbian government can do to avoid its present bind. Having extradited the war criminals, Mladic and Hazdic, to the Hague Tribunal, President Tadic has sought to bring Serbia's EU accession closer. But with the main international players recognising the personality and territorial disposition of Kosovo, the status of the Serb enclave—and the issue of territorial cession and the unsavoury precedent that it could set for other parts of the Balkans—will have to be addressed. The resolution of territorial disputes is a longstanding condition of EU membership and the recent provocation by Pristina will cause a headache in Belgrade, where the government appears convinced of a need to move away from its own past and towards the EU.

Sources: Al Jazeera, BBC, Dallas Morning News, Spiegel, United Nations

Libya and the problem of conflicting scripts: humanitarianism, European security and the 'boat people'

This article examines the different treatment of North African migrants in media reports since the beginning of the 'Arab Spring' in early 2011. Western governments and aid and humanitarian organisations have been quick to discuss a humanitarian crisis at the land borders of North African states since the revolts against regional regimes prompted many thousands of people to attempt to cross them. The plight of these migrants has contributed one strand to the rationale presented for the intervention of an international coalition.

By contrast, the migrants who have sought to cross the Mediterranean have been incorporated into a security or criminality 'script' by the European governments and media outlets. It seems that the different destintations of the migrants appears to determine the validity of their flight and, should they choose to become Europe's 'irregular entrants', then they are immediately downgraded to a criminal status as they enter the discursive 'territory' of Europe that is bound up with the exigencies of electoral and bureaucratic politics.

There are a variety of implications, chief among them the violations of human rights that European governments and the EU itself risk committing. It seems that it is far preferable for the governments of the states that receive the migrants to be complicit in the creation of a humanitarian crisis at the margins of Europe's space than it is for them to deal with migrants humanely and in accordance with international legal principles. Given the popular power of the criminality discourse in Europe, it would appear that the stakes, in electoral terms, are too high for this to be a realistic option for European politicians.

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