India's Modi attacks China's territorial aims

On 23 February, Indian opposition leader Narendra Modi travelled to Arunachal Pradesh, close to a disputed Himalayan border, to hold an election rally in which he bluntly warned China against its territorial ambitions. Modi, who is currently the front-runner in the race to become India’s next prime minister, said that China "will have to leave behind its mind-set of expansion".

China’s Foreign Ministry on 24 February dismissed the latest comments, denying the country had expansionist territorial ambitions, instead framing the decades-long dispute as a sensitive hangover from history. A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, replied by saying that "you can all see in history China has never actively launched a war of aggression to invade and occupy one inch of territory".

This rather diplomatic response is in stark contrast to the recent comments made by Beijing towards Tokyo, where it has also been accused of robust territorial aims in the East China Sea. Many see the unusually muted stance towards India as purely strategic, coming as it does in an election year. Worryingly for China, Japan’s Premier Shinzo Abe recently visited New Delhi and signed various peace and trade agreements with India’s incumbent Manmohan Singh in a bid to bolster ties between to the two nations.

India-China relations have been tense and prone to flare-ups since the two fought a border war in 1962, which saw tens of thousands of casualties on both sides. When Britain withdrew as the colonial power and granted independence to India in 1947, it left behind a myopic legacy of clumsily demarcated borders between India and its northern neighbours. The disputed land covers an area of 150,000 km² along a 4,000 km frontier that has never been explicitly delineated. This is problematic, given that both countries account for around one third of the world's population, with a total GDP of over US$10 trillion.

In the last 50 years, the Asian giants have held 16 rounds of talks in an effort to settle their border dispute, almost to no avail. A border pact was signed in Beijing on 23 October 2013 following territorial incursions that brought tensions to the fore last year. Both sides have pledged to increase bilateral trade to US$100 billion by 2015, following a 20% drop in Indian exports to China last year.

Japanese jets intercept Chinese plane

On 7 January, Japanese fighter jets were scrambled to intercept a Chinese government plane flying towards the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. The Y-12 propeller plane flew unannounced into Japan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) approximately one hundred miles from the Islands, which China refers to as the Diaoyu Islands. This incident is the latest in a series of confrontations between China and Japan, both of whom seeking ownership of the uninhabited Islands in a bid to claim hegemony over the strategic, hydrocarbon-rich East China Sea.

Tuesday’s events follow what the Japanese view as China’s belligerent announcement of its new ADIZ back in November 2013, which led to the US, Japan’s main ally, flying two B52 bombers through the newly announced air space in protest at the move.  The navies and air forces of the two Asian giants have also repeatedly confronted each other in the locale of the Islands since Japan nationalised them in 2012, with both premiers taking a tougher stand over foreign policy. International observers worry that, if these confrontations continue to increase in frequency and intensity, they could escalate to military engagements drawing in other world powers.

In an unusual diplomatic exchange between officials of the two countries, the Chinese Ambassador to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, wrote "If militarism is like the haunting Voldermort of Japan, the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo is a kind of horcrux, representing the darkest parts of that nation's soul." In response to the comments referencing Harry Potter’s arch nemesis, the Japanese Ambassador, Keiichi Hayashi, warned that his counterpart’s country risked becoming the “Lord Voldemort of East Asia”.

It is believed the eight uninhabited islands are located near potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves and strategic shipping lanes, as well as being situated in valuable fishing waters. The island's Exclusive Economic Zone would grant the controlling state sovereignty over these resources.

For further analysis on the claims by each side to these islands, please visit our border briefing page on the East China Sea.

China at odds with Japan, US over new air zone

This week has seen a marked challenge to the US' decades-long hegemony over the Asia-Pacific region. On Saturday 23 November, China announced the creation of a new “air defence identification zone” in the East China Sea, which controversially overlaps with an air zone set out by Japan and covers the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Both Japan and the US are heavily opposed to the air zone and see it is a destabilising move in an already fraught maritime area dividing these two Asian neighbours.

Unannounced, the US flew two B52 bombers over the disputed Islands in defiance at the new Chinese air rules on Tuesday 26 November. The aircraft took off from the island of Guam, a US military outpost in the Pacific, as part of a routine defence exercise, without filing the flight plans with Chinese authorities, sending a clear signal that Washington is not prepared to accept any unilateral change to the status quo. China said that the entire flight was closely monitored and that aircraft that pass through the zone must obey its rules and declare their plans.

Beijing has told Tokyo that the flight information for all Japanese-chartered flights travelling through this air space must be filed with them in advance. Having firstly met the request, Japan's premier Shinzo Abe said shortly after the US bomber flight that Japan would not be doing so in future, saying instead that the zone was “invalid”.

Military muscles were flexed by both powers this week as tensions continue to mount. The day after the B52s flew across the East China Sea, the Japanese parliament passed a bill which enshrined a national security council, effectively handing over more control of the state military apparatus to Abe. On Wednesday 27 December, China's President Xi Jinping launched the country's Liaoning aircraft carrier into the South China Sea – another area where they are engaged in several maritime border disputes.

Relations between the second and third-largest economies in the world have been strained during the last year, as Japan has remained defiant of its territorial rights over islands in the East China Sea in the face of an increasingly robust foreign policy by China. Ships and aircraft from both sides have been involved in provocative military exercises in each other's back yards since Japan officially bought three of the islands from a private owner in September 2012.

It is believed the eight uninhabited islands, referred to as the Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands by Japan and China respectively, are located near potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves and strategic shipping lanes, as well as being situated in valuable fishing waters. The island's Exclusive Economic Zone would grant the controlling state sovereignty over these resources.

For further analysis on the claims by each side to these islands, please visit our border briefing page on the East China Sea.

India and China sign border pact

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed a peace pact in Beijing on 23 October, aimed at easing tension along their disputed Himalayan border. The two Asian neighbours have seen tensions resurface this year in the form of incursions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), following decades of disagreement as to the demarcation of the boundary. However, the pact, seen by many as an interim measure, was signed amid comments from Singh that “it will take time to resolve”, stressing that this was not an “easy issue”.

Entitled “Border Defence Co-operation”, this agreement is the fifth such arrangement made between China and India in the last 20 years. It sets out the terms of engagement, committing the armed forces on both sides of the border to “maximum self-restraint” to prevent any unwarranted exchange of fire. Nevertheless, there is also an ambiguous tone to much of the document. Article VI precludes either side from following the other's patrols if they venture into “areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control”, essentially giving tacit consent to incursions into neighbouring territory.

The disputed land covers an area of 150,000 km² along a 4,000 km frontier that has never been explicitly delineated. This is problematic, given that both countries account for around one third of the world's population, with a total GDP of over $10 trillion. Premier Li says their relationship is “the most important bilateral friendship in the world”, which is not necessarily hyperbole. If accidental war were to break out as a result of their rift over this border, it would have untold effect on their respective economic output and could result in significant loss of life. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 saw tens of thousands of casualties from the largely land-based warfare that was waged in harsh, mountainous conditions.

The war was sparked, in part, by China's construction of a strategic highway in the 1950s linking western Tibet with its province of Xinjiang. Eventually the Indian authorities discovered that the road crossed southwards into what it considered to be its territory, based on the Johnson Line, a 19 ^th century colonial border delineated by the British surveyor, W H Johnson. When Britain eventually withdrew as the colonial power and granted independence to India in 1947, it left behind a myopic legacy of clumsily drawn borders between India and its northern neighbours, with no measures, other than palliative ones, taken to address this issue.

In the last 50 years, the Asian giants have held 16 rounds of talks in an effort to settle their border dispute, almost to no avail. Both sides have pledged to increase bilateral trade to $100 billion by 2015, following a 20% drop in Indian exports to China last year.

Offshore exploration tender issued by CNOOC

China's leading offshore oil producer, the state-run CNOOC, has issued a tender on the company website yesterday inviting IOCs to bid to participate in the exploration of 25 oil and gas blocks, the majority of which are located in the South and East China Sea. The blocks cover a total area of 102,577km², include 10 highly attractive deep-water patches and represent the largest offshore tender offered (in terms of real size) by China since the 1990s.

The announcement is the latest in a series of moves by China to assert its claims in the strategically-located South and East China Sea by launching tenders for oil and gas blocks, as well as frequent diplomatic manoeuvres and shows of military strength. Tellingly, the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not formally meet at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit last week, following an escalation of tensions between the two Asian giants over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Last week, Abe made a defiant statement claiming that Japan would not make any concessions on its territorial integrity.

Two of the newly announced blocks, 33/02 and 41/14 in the Lishui Sag area, are located in close proximity to the disputed Islands, whose purchase by Japan last year reignited the centuries-old question over ownership. The state-run company is also thought to be investing $5 billion in developing submerged gas fields in the East China Sea, with the possibility of tapping gas deposits in Japanese waters through diagonal and horizontal drilling methods. The company has already come under scrutiny this month from Green Dragon Gas, which claims that CNOOC breached production sharing contracts by drilling wells on its licences without notification.

In June, China angered Vietnam by inviting IOCs to jointly participate in the development of nine blocks in the waters around Hainan, blocks which Hanoi considers overlap into their maritime territory. CNOOC's usual operating procedure is to team up with foreign firms during the exploration phase, but holds the right to take a 51% in the block once a commercial find is made. PetroVietnam was involved in a dispute with its northern neighbour last December when Beijing accused it of 'unilateral oil and gas exploration activities'.

For more background on the China-Japan Islands dispute, please refer to our previous news story dated 30 September 2013.

Tensions escalate between China and Japan

China's President Xi Jinping said Monday that he will not meet Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation summit this week, following comments made by Abe at a news conference in New York over a disputed islet. Speaking to reporters on Friday, Abe said that “Japan will not make a concession on our territorial integrity,” but stressed that he did not wish to escalate the issue any further, despite what he called “intrusions by Chinese government vessels in our territorial waters.”

Relations between the second and third-largest economies in the world have been strained during the last year, as Japan has remained defiant of its territorial rights over islands in the East China Sea in the face of an increasingly robust foreign policy by China. Ships and aircraft from both sides have been involved in provocative military exercises in each other's back yards for over a year, since Japan officially bought three of the islands from a private owner in September 2012.

It is believed the eight uninhabited islands, referred to as the Senkaku and Diaoyu Islands by Japan and China respectively, are located near potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves, strategic shipping lanes and in valuable fishing waters. The island's exclusive economic zone would grant the controlling state sovereignty over these resources. Unsurprisingly, Chinese protests over the sovereignty of the islands only began in the mid-1970s, after the oil and gas discoveries were first made.

China's claims to the islands date back many centuries, historically serving as important fishing waters for the Chinese province of Taiwan. In the 19th century, they were ceded, along with Taiwan, to Japan in the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki. They were formally incorporated into Japanese territory, as part of the Ryukyu Islands (modern day Okinawa), that same year and retained that status until after the Second World War.

In 1951, Japan's claim to Taiwan was renounced in the Treaty of San Francisco, and the islands subsequently fell under US trusteeship until they were returned to Japan twenty years later. Despite the question of sovereignty over the islands being raised in both 1951 and 1971, China at no point contested the outcomes of those formal agreements. Beijing has retrospectively argued that they should have been returned, but the Kuomintag leader, Chiang Kai-shek, did not make these feelings heard at the time. Worth noting is that the islands are also claimed by Taiwan.

India's Defence minister A K Antony said yesterday that his country was “strengthening its capabilities on the border” with China, while at the same time seeking an amicable solution to a boundary conflict that has raged for decades. Speaking in Hindon at the induction ceremony of a new aircraft into the Indian Air Force, the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III, he stated that the Indian action was in response to Chinese efforts to strengthen their position along the Asian neighbours' 3,500 km border. A joint military exercise is meant to be taking place soon; however a date has not yet been set.

Antony's comments follow a number of confrontations in recent months. In April, Chinese troops crossed into the Ladakh sector of Jammu and Kashmir and pitched tents, only leaving after three weeks and a series of negotiations. Then, on June 17, Chinese troops once again entered Indian territory, specifically the Chumar area of the Ladakh sector, confiscating a surveillance camera which they later returned. In a recent report commissioned by the Prime Minister's Office, it was revealed that Indian troops had been aggressively prevented from patrolling areas of the border region, such as Daulet Beg Oldi and Chumar, by Chinese forces.

India and China relations have been tense and prone to flare-ups since the two fought a border war in 1962. When Britain withdrew as the colonial power and granted independence to India in 1947, it left behind a myopic legacy of clumsily drawn borders between India and its northern neighbours. The area of Kashmir is no exception, and has been the scene of intense conflict between India and Pakistan and, more recently, has seen territorial claims by China with the support of Islamabad, its ally in South Asia. In the last 50 years, New Delhi and Beijing have held 15 rounds of talks in an effort to settle their border dispute, almost to no avail.

UK company interested in exploration of disputed West Philippines Sea

Forum Energy Company (FEC) has made an expression of interest to the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD) earlier this month to begin exploration for gas and oil in the disputed West Philippines Sea. The company, which boasts a number of projects in the Philippines, can already navigate 18 miles off the coast of Palawan, under the conditions set out in its Service Contracts 40 and 72. FEC presented its case to the directors of the PCSD at the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Session Hall on 2 August.

Governor of Palawan Jose Alvarez, who attended the presentation, reassured FEC that it would not restrict the company's efforts to explore further afield offshore Palawan, instead urging caution and care, particularly in relation to the natural environment, insisting that the PCSD would fully support pro-development projects on the condition that they were non-intrusive and benefitted the local community. Regarding the safety of the UK oil firm's employees in the waters of the highly disputed West Philippine Sea, Chief of Staff of the Western Command, Colonel Emmanuel Salamat, claimed that the strong Philippine military presence in the area would ensure the security of FEC's offshore operations.

China lays claim to, and has de facto control of, virtually the entire South China Sea, despite the claims of a total of six countries to maritime territory in the South China Sea. This horseshoe-shaped area, delineated by China's so-called “nine-dash line”, stretches over a vast area that Beijing claims historical rights to. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Albert Del Rosario, argues that this territory encompasses not only the entire South China Sea but also violates Philippine rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, an EEZ and a continental shelf, as stipulated by UNCLOS.

Last year saw a standoff involving Chinese military ships and Philippine vessels after the former took control of the Scarborough Shoal, referred to by China as Nansha, over 500km due West of Manila. The Philippines also lay claim to the Spratly Islands, which lie in the vicinity of Palawan, under the legal justification of Res Nullius. Beijing insists on its “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in [the] South China Sea and its adjacent waters” and has refused calls by its maritime neighbour to settle the dispute through arbitration.

China and the Philippines in South China Sea stand-off

Ships from China and the Philippines are engaged in a stand-off over a remote and disputed shoal in the South China Sea. Despite the tension, both sides are pledging a diplomatic solution.

A warship from the Philippines approached the Scarborough Shoal, off the country’s northwestern coast, on 7 April as part of a routine patrol. There it found eight Chinese fishing boats, and upon boarding them claimed to have found illegally-caught fish and coral.

Two Chinese surveillance boats then arrived and blocked the Philippine warship from arresting the fishermen. A third arrived on 11 April, whilst the Philippines sent a second vessel to back up its warship on 12 April.

 

The situation is reportedly tense, with the fishermen essentially blockaded onto the uninhabited shoal. The Chinese media has taken a bellicose stance, warning that it will “react accordingly” in the event of a military clash and accused Manila of taking a “radical approach”.

Chinese state media and government officials have also been insistent that the shoal belongs to China. Filipino Foreign Secretary Albert Del Roasrio, meanwhile, said that the shoal “is an integral part of Philippine territory”.

The dispute over ownership reflects a much wider dispute over maritime borders in the South China Sea. China claims vast tracts of the sea, including its many island chains, largely due to the extensive oil and gas resources which are believed to lie beneath them.

 

Despite the confrontation, both Manila and Beijing have stated their commitment to a diplomatic solution. Filipino officials have reportedly proposed a compromise solution, although details have not been made public and China has not formally responded.

 
The situation is likely to cool down but it underscores the rising tensions across the South China Sea, where relations China and US-backed states are increasingly fraught. Manila recently called for a coordinated stance by South-East Asian states on the South China Sea, before entering into discussions with China on maritime borders.

Sources: Guardian, BBC, Global Times, Reuters

China, Philippines positive on defusing South China Sea tensions

China and the Philippines are closer to settling a long-running dispute over their maritime boundary, after a state visit by Philippine President Beningno Aquino to Beijing which began on 31st August. During the visit Aquino, who this summer has been bullish towards China, struck a conciliatory note. Calling for greater economic links between the two states, he announced that “the Philippines is indeed open for business”.

The Philippine President is accompanied by 300 business leaders in an attempt to boost bilateral economic relations, anticipating an increase to $60 billion in five years, up from $27.7 billion in 2010. 

However the main focus of the visit is on the contested border in the South China Sea, where the Philippines – like many other Southeast Asian states – are at loggerheads with Beijing over maritime boundaries and the ownership of the isolated Spratly Islands. Disputes over the islands, or rather the extensive oil and gas reserves believed to lie beneath them, are a potential flashpoint for conflict.

Aquino and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao released a joint statement on 1st September, in which they “agreed not to let the maritime disputes affect the broader picture of friendship and cooperation” and “reiterated their commitment to addressing the disputes through peaceful dialogue”. Although this is standard diplomatic boilerplate, Aquino did reveal some signs of progress the previous evening. 

Speaking to reporters after meeting Hu, Aquino revealed that China is now calling for a legally binding code of conduct for all nations operating in the South China Sea. This would go beyond the non-binding 'guidelines' which regional states had agreed on at a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July. Aquino was buoyed by the news, calling the Chinese proposal “very significant”. Hu also contributed to the positive atmosphere, calling for the South China Sea to develop into “a sea of friendship, peace and cooperation”. 

A legally binding code of conduct would be difficult to draw up, if the wrangling over the July guidelines is any guide. Disagreements between the ASEAN nations ensured that the proposals were ambiguous and vague. Other regional states will be watching carefully to see if China's proposed code of conduct would favour Beijing or be designed to exclude the US, which has backed the smaller states, from regional affairs. Given China's assertive stance in the South China Sea, it is unlikely to make any concessions. 

In any case, a code of conduct would be extremely difficult to enforce. Most regional states have strayed from the spirit if not the letter of the 'Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea', agreed in 2002. It would be surprising if a legally binding code of conduct would seem sacrosanct when other legal tools, such as international arbitration, have yet to prevent regional disputes and confrontations.

Sources: AFP, Reuters, Bloomberg, Xinhua

Tibetan Lama raises border tensions between India and China

Ogyen Trinley Dorje

His daring escape from Tibet seemed out of a movie. Then only 14, Ogyen Trinley Dorje was one of Tibetan Buddhism's most revered incarnate lamas, and his journey through the icy passes of the Himalayas was viewed as a major embarrassment for China. The youth arrived in India in early 2000 to a euphoric greeting from Tibetan exiles.

India, though, was less certain about what to do with him. Intelligence agencies, suspicious of his loyalties and skeptical of his miraculous escape, interrogated him and tightly restricted his travel. He remains mostly confined to the mountainside monastery of a Tibetan sect different from his own. And that spurred an idea: He wanted his own monastery. Eventually, his aides struck a deal to buy land.

Now, the 17th Karmapa http://twitter.com/#%21/Karmapa17, as he is known, has seen his quest for a monastery unexpectedly set off a national furor, fanned by Indian media that have tapped into growing public anxiety about Chinese intentions on their disputed border.

The Indian police are investigating the Karmapa after discovering about $1 million in foreign currency at his residence, including more than $166,000 in Chinese currency. Flimsily sourced media accounts have questioned whether he is a Chinese spy plotting a monastic empire along the border.

Monk or Chinese Plant? http://www.tribuneindia.com/2011/20110131/edit.htm#1 asked an editorial in The Tribune, a national English-language newspaper.

Many Tibetans scoff at the spying allegations http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/world/asia/05briefs-China.html. But the episode starkly exposes the precarious position of the Dalai Lama and the exiled movement of Tibetan Buddhism he has led since he fled China in 1959. The Tibetan cause depends heavily on Indian good will, particularly as China has intensified efforts to discredit and infiltrate their exileorganization.

Tensions are rising between India and China over a variety of issues, including Tibet. Sophisticated hackers, traced to China, have penetrated computer systems in Dharamsala and at Indian government ministries. China has long blamed Tibetan exiles in India for fueling instability across the border in Tibet. But now India, too, seems more wary of Tibetan activities; the Indian police are investigating new Tibetan monasteries near the border for possible ties to China, a police official told the New York Times.

Meanwhile, Chinese leaders are betting that the Tibetan movement will fracture after the eventual death of the Dalai Lama, who is 74; they have even declared their intent to name his successor.

Indian suspicions about the Karmapa are a particular problem. He has a global following and, at 25 years old, he is viewed as a potential future leader of the movement - a possibility deeply compromised if Indian authorities consider him a foreign agent.

What Tibetans must address is the idea that Tibetans could be considered a security threat to India and not an asset, said Tsering Shakya, a leading Tibet specialist.

"But the idea that a boy at the age of 14 was selected as a covert agent by a foreign government to destabilize India - and the assumption the boy will assume leadership of the Tibetan movement and eventually work against India - is worthy of a cheap spy novel," according to Shakya.

For the past week, Tibetans have rallied behind the Karmapa, with thousands of monks holding candlelight vigils at his residence. Tibet’s political leaders, including the Dalai Lama, have called on the Karmapa’s aides to correct any financial irregularities but have dismissed any suspicions about the Karmapa’s being a Chinese agent.

“Baseless, all baseless,” said Samdhong Rinpoche, the prime minister of the Tibetan government in exile. “Not a fraction of anything that has a base of truth.”

Many Indian intelligence agents have distrusted the Karmapa from the start. He was a unique case, since both the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government had endorsed him. He would explain his escape as an act of principle; he was being pressured to denounce the Dalai Lama, and Chinese officials also were forbidding him to study with high lamas outside China. Many investigators were unconvinced, wondering how such an important figure could slip so easily over the border.

 

On Wednesday 2nd February, when the procession of monks arrived to offer support, the Karmapa described the current controversy as a ‘misunderstanding’ and expressed confidence in the fairness of Indian authorities.

“We all have taken refuge and settled here,” he said. “India, in contrast to Communist China, is a democratic country that is based on the rule of law. Therefore, I trust that things will improve and the truth will become clear in time.”

Within Tibetan Buddhism, the Karmapa ranks third after the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, with each man believed to be reincarnated through the centuries. After the death of the previous Karmapa, a bitter feud broke out between the high lamas charged with identifying his successor: at least two other people now claim to be the Karmapa, though a majority of Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama, recognize Ogyen Trinley Dorje.

 

But this dispute has complicated efforts by the Karmapa to claim the monastery built by his predecessor in the Indian border region of Sikkim. Indian officials have blocked him from taking ownership until claims from rival Tibetan factions are resolved - which is why, given the uncertainty over the duration of the legal fight, the Karmapa sought land for a new monastery, his aides say.

The land deal led to the current controversy. On 26th January, India's Republic Day, police officers apprehended two men at a highway checkpoint after discovering about $219,000 in Indian rupees inside their car - money they said had come from the Karmapa. The next day, the police raided the Gyuto Monastery and found boxes of cash from more than 20 countries, including China; officers arrested the financial officer overseeing the Karmapa's charitable trust and continue to investigate the Karmapa himself.

 

“He ran from China,” said P. L. Thakur, the police inspector general in Dharamsala. “Tibet is under China. Why and how has this currency come here? For what purpose? Why was it being kept there?”

Naresh Mathur, one of the Karmapa’s lawyers, said the money was from the devotees who for the past decade had come from around the world for the Karmapa’s blessing. By custom, they leave an offering, usually envelopes of cash; the Chinese renminbi, he said, are from Tibetans or other Chinese who have made a pilgrimage to Dharamsala.

Mr. Mathur said the Karmapa’s aides were unable to deposit the money because they were awaiting a decision on their application, made several years ago, for government approval to accept foreign currency. In the interim, they say, the money is stored where the officers found it in boxes kept in a dorm room shared by monks.

Mr. Mathur also denied any suggestion that the land deal was secretive or illegal, and he said that it was the seller who demanded cash.

For many Tibetans, the broader concern is about the future of the Tibetan movement itself. Tenzin Tsundue is a Tibetan activist who once unfurled a ‘Free Tibet’ banner at an appearance by President Hu Jintao of China. He says India has always been a steadfast friend of Tibetans, providing a home for as many as 120,000 Tibetan refugees, yet now he worries its support may be wavering.

“This country that we are so grateful to is alleging the Karmapa is a spy for China,” he said. “And we can’t understand that at all.”

Source: New York Times

Google Maps: Virtual Land Grabs and ‘Google Recognition’

Considering the Ilemi Triangle for two previous Menas Borders pieces, it was interesting to note its treatment in Google Maps (Map 1). Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan all make territorial claims to the Triangle while Kenya is the state that polices and de facto administers the territory. This notwithstanding, it is important to note that there has never been any cession of territory by the state with the recognised de jure territorial claim, Sudan.

Map 1: The Ilemi Triangle at http://maps.google.co.uk/ – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Google’s treatment of Ilemi is perhaps indicative of its responses to the problems represented by the ‘symbology’ of territorial borders. (As noted in a Google blog, border position and image resolution are two other problematic areas.) Google argues that it has attempted to address the qualitative aspects of positional and territorial disputes and that its concern with symbology involves the recognition that territorial disputes and settlements do not represent any static horizon. Their evolution, it is argued, means that Google has to use a degree of nuance in its depiction of territorial borders and employ several methods to denote the uncertainty and conflict that surrounds the site, and even mere existence, of many territorial borders.

The current line used in Google Maps to denote the northern extent of Ilemi is seemingly based on the 1938 Wakefield Line. Wakefield is a revision of the 1931 Red Line that was never intended to delimit an international boundary. Indeed, the sole official boundary, recognised in 1914, is that surveyed by Captain Maud’s expedition in 1902. So the function of Wakefield was to show the extent of Kenyan administration upon the territory of colonial Sudan, its condominium government having afforded its Kenyan counterpart a ‘right of hot pursuit’ across the international boundary in 1928.

For its part, the 1938 extension of Wakefield was drawn in order to accommodate more adequately the transhumant grazing patterns of the Turkana people. This extension has, of course, suited Kenyan interests well and has provided the basis for the claim that is still exercised by Kenyan governments. However, as far as I can tell, no Kenyan government has made any application, to any authority, for a formal transfer of territory other than in 1967. At this point, after independence, Kenyatta’s government sought British intervention in support of the cession of the Triangle to Kenya. For a variety of reasons—perhaps because of the waning British influence, or maybe the formulation of the 1964 OAU declaration on the sacrosanctity of territorial borders (itself consistently flouted by Kenya in its practice on Ilemi)—nothing came of this. Since, other pressures—most obviously a number of armed conflicts—have meant that the matter remains unresolved and the de facto control of the Triangle territory preserved, however informally. But by excluding the 1914 Line Google Maps ‘silences’ the only internationally recognised boundary. In so doing it reinforces the tenuous Kenyan claim to the Triangle and the Red/Wakefield Line as an international boundary which it is certainly not. Google Maps in effect performs its own geopolitical action by silencing Maud’s line and performing a virtual territorial grab on the part of Kenya.

So how far has Google Maps come to represent a proxy for international recognition of a border? It could not be argued that ‘Google recognition’ has arrived to supplant the mechanisms of public international law since Google Maps’ launch in 2005 and yet Google Maps does serve to reinforce particular interests. It does so through perhaps nothing more than the sources of its data (including, for example, the US State Department). Particular cartographies serve particular policies, privileged interests and parties to alliances; so the Google Maps data cannot be regarded as authoritative or impartial statements on the authentic positionality of territorial borders. It can do little more than privilege the interpretation of the source which, if needs be, is to the cost of international law. (The positions adopted by the US toward Kenya and Sudan might prove instructive in this sense, but there is no space for consideration of that here.) The point is, then, that the Google Maps is a powerful tool which, given its accessibility, has the capacity to gain a measure of seeming-legitimacy and penetrate the geopolitical imaginations of those who, in the best of faith, consume its depictions of space. On this view Google has a responsibility that must extend further than simply tailoring the depiction of particular disputed borders according to the location of an IP address.

Perhaps this is to overstate the case. Nonetheless, it is to show that supposed objectivity counts for little and that uncertainty over a territorial disposition counts for far more when it is only partially reproduced in Google’s software. Indeed, it is a testament to the legitimacy that Google Maps now seems to bestow upon these dispositions that governments are seemingly prepared to act militarily where and when a virtual territorial grab may be construed as threatening the interests of states. One such example is in the recent Nicaraguan incursion into Costa Rican territory (October 2010), although this orthodox interpretation arguably neglects the background to the incident: the commander of the Nicaraguan military unit perhaps refers to Google Maps to explain a Nicaraguan mistake rather than truly stake a claim to territory. Indeed, Google admitted to a mistake, blaming incorrect data supplied by the US State Department; perhaps there is the risk of unfairly vilifying Google in this case. Nonetheless the dispute still escalated, the Nicaraguans subsequently claiming, in something of an about-turn, the validity of the Google map. The ICJ ruling that put a formal end to the territorial dispute in 2009 relied heavily on the Canas-Jerez Treaty (1858) which, especially in an era of sophisticated mapping and cartographic technologies, can only contain manifold ambiguities and inspire a variety of competing interpretations. Perhaps Google’s failing—which is only the equivalent of that of any archival hermeneut of treaties and the associated geographical information—is that it cannot itself act as the arbiter of objectivity, truth and coherence, a status to which it is perhaps popularly elevated by consequence of its accessibility and ready availability. So perhaps the important question is how the Google Maps interpretation—which, Google having parted ways from its private partner, Tele Atlas, is derived from government data sources—has become the dominant interpretation.

This month Tajikistan’s lower house of parliament ratified a border agreement with China. This must still be ratified by the Tajik Senate but the agreement would end a dispute that dates back to the nineteenth century and result in a significant transfer of territory (1,000 sq km to China and 27,500 sq km to Tajikistan). Controversy surrounds the agreement and its ratification: rumours have circulated as to the extent of the territorial transfer, parliamentary deputies have claimed to have been unaware of the agreement (made in 2002) until the last few weeks, others have claimed that any transfer represents a violation of the Tajik constitution or a diplomatic defeat despite the limited proportion (c. 1%) of Tajik territory affected. Given this uncertainty perhaps it is fortunate that Google, however inadvertently, has effectively hedged its bets (see Map 2). The data with which it has drawn its dotted, equivocal border is seemingly far vaguer in terms of image resolution than is the Bing Maps equivalent (Map 3). (Bing is Microsoft’s equivalent service which did, interestingly enough, have the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border in the usual location.)

Map 2: The China-Tajikistan border at http://maps.google.co.uk/ – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Map 3: The China-Tajikistan border at http://www.bing.com/maps/  – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Above all, therefore, it is perhaps only due to the considerable weight, high profile and accessibility of Google Maps that it has become the focus of ire over the last few years and as other services emerge to challenge its dominance the picture may only become more uncertain with the addition of different sources and interpretation. In the meantime, Google Maps must persevere in its concerns with symbology, positionality and image resolution in order to address the contingency and dynamism of the territorial dispositions that it has chosen to relay. We should also be wary of parties using the ambiguities of these maps, vilifying Google and its sources in the process, in justifying their actions, and journalistic sources jumping on the bandwagon in speaking of ‘21^st Century War’.

China and Tajikistan end century-long border row

Map of Tajikistan

Tajikistan's lower house of parliament ratified an agreement on Wednesday 12th January to demarcate its border with China, ending a century-old conflict over territory in Central Asia's Pamir mountains.



While China will gain 1,000sq km of land, Tajikistan will gain 27,500sq km of land.


The territorial dispute started between Tsarist Russia and Imperial China in the second half of the 19th century, and future governments have been unable find a solution.


The Majlisi Namoyandagon, Tajikistan's lower chamber of Parliament, ratified a protocol on demarcation of their common border with China. The boundary dispute had been settled in agreements signed by both sides in 2002. The agreement still must be ratified by Tajikistan's senate, but that is not expected to be problematic.


While the government is claiming the agreement as a 'great victory' for Tajik diplomacy, opposition parties are less convinced.


Tajik Foreign Minister Khamrokhon Zarifi celebrated the agreement, which ceded only three per cent of the disputed territories to China.


"These disputable territories are nearly 20 per cent of Tajikistan's territory, while under the protocol, only 1,000 square kilometres, or 3 per cent of the disputable territories, are ceded to China," the minister said.

Opposition politicians, however, said the agreement flouted the constitution of the country, which says the territory of Tajikistan is 'inseparable and inviolable'.


Leader of the opposition Islamic Revival Party, Muhiddin Kabiri said the land transfer represents a defeat for Tajik diplomacy. Kabiri is one of only two opposition members in parliament.


Despite the fact that the agreement was reached in 2002, parliamentary deputies said they had been unaware of the agreement with China until several days ago. The leader of the Communist Party of Tajikistan (which generally backs the president), Shodi Shabdolov said people were unhappy about the lack of transparency.


"Nobody had reliable information and many rumours were in society that allegedly a huge part of Tajik territory will be ceded to China," said Shabdolov. The territory ceded to China represents less than one per cent of Tajikistan's land.

Sources: Times of India, Reuters, Washington Post

For more information on Central Asian border, see the Menas Borders website, here.

Sino-Russian border compromise results in joint development of Heixiazi Island

Heixiazi Island, the orange portion is what China acquired in 2008

Proof that compromise over border disputes can benefit everyone involved, an island that used to be a major source of conflict between China and Russia is set to become a major tourist and business hub.

Heixiazi Island (Bolshoi Urrusiysky Island to the Russians) is a 327square km sandbar in the middle of the confluence of the Heilongjiang and Wusuli Rivers (also known as the Amur and Ussuri Rivers). The Russians have occupied the island since 1929, when Soviet troops took it during a border clash, but the two countries reached an agreement in July 2008 to share it. The Russians simultaneously returned Yinlong Island (Tarabarov Island). The agreement officially marked the end of demarcation of the 4,300km Sino-Russian border.

The Chinese half of the island is currently off limits, and guarded by the military, and the local Heilongjian government is planning to develop it into a northern winter resort, drawing tourists from nearby Russia, Japan and South Korea. The local government plans to invest some US$1.47 billion in Heixiazi, with plans for hotels, a free trade shopping centre and an industrial park. The Russians have previously used the island as a military base, and it is only sparsely inhabited.

Much of the Chinese development plans are directed at the Russians. The industrial park, for example, will house factories making products for the Russian market. Khabarovsk, one of the largest cities in Eastern Russia, is nearby Heixiazi, and is set to be linked with the island through jointly-developed roads, bridges, ports, a railroad and possibly an airport. Khabarovsk is well connected to the rest of the country by rail, thereby enabling Heixiazi’s products to reach the wider Russian market.

Heilongjiang province has had considerable success developing its tourism industry. Sun Island, in the middle of the Songhua River near Harbin, is a summer resort, featuring beaches, theme parks and a reserve for the endangered Siberian tiger. In the winter, it is the site of the popular Harbin Ice Festival.

Not everyone in China was happy about the resolution of the border disputes with Russia. Much of what is now the Sino-Russian border was a legacy of treaties between first the Qing Dynasty and the Russia empire, and later the various Chinese governments dealings with the Soviets. Many in China consider these treaties to be ‘unequal’, especially regarding territory in Manchuria and Mongolia. Many in China thought they rightfully deserved the whole of Heixiazi island, not only half.

Still, with property developers ready to move in, and northern China set to benefit from wealthy Russian and Japanese tourists, those who were against the agreement may come to see half as better than nothing.

Sources: China Briefing, Pravda, China Daily

Chinese warships in Burmese port worries Indians

Chinese navy officers aboard the Guangzhou at Thilwa Port

Two warships from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) docked on Sunday 29th August at Thilawa Port near Rangoon, Burma. It was the first time Chinese naval warships have visited Burma in their 60-year relationship, and is being viewed as a statement of intent to exert control over the Indian Ocean.

Chinese media has reported that the warships were sent with the aim of promoting friendly relations with the Burmese navy. While Burma has long been a rogue state in the eyes of the West, China is the junta's key ally, investor and trading partner. In November 2009, China began construction of a pipeline across Burma and has been involved in the development of hydro power. China has also sold Burma arms and has been able to shield it from UN sanctions as a result of its permanent member status on the UN Security Council. In return, China has secured access to raw materials from Burma, such as teak and gems.

A key factor of their relationship, however, is China's desire for access to the Indian Ocean. A 2009 report by Chinese scholars Li Chenyang and Ley Liang Fook said:

“China wants to shift from a one-ocean state to a safer and more stable two-ocean state to enhance its security. Hence, a core objective of China's policy towards Myanmar [Burma] is to establish a strategic network of road, rail and air transport from Yunnan Province in the southwest through Myanmar to the Indian Ocean and also to construct water, oil and gas pipelines.”

While Indian and China have a 3,500km-long disputed Himalayan border, it is possible that in the future the flashpoint for disputes between the two Asian heavyweights will be the Indian Ocean. Both countries have been raising the international profile of their navies, for example, in fighting pirates off the coast of Somalia. But China has been the more aggressive country in using its navy for diplomatic purposes, such as last week's visit to Burma. According to US Navy Commander Steven L. Horrell, the US Navy, India and China are all competing for influence in the Indian Ocean, to protect their strategic interests. He insists, however that China's moves are "not incompatible with a peaceful rise."

In recent years, China has expanded its port facilities in countries that border India, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Burma, but while it should be noted that the ports are commercial structures, not naval bases, Indian strategists have nonetheless refered to the projects as a 'string of pearls' encircling India in its strategic back yard. The Indian Ocean has been described as the 'Silk Road of the 21st century', moving Gulf oil and African minerals to the world's two most populous nations.

The visit of the Chinese navy to Burma comes a time of already heightened tension between China and India; Beijing recently denied a visa to Indian Lt. Gen. B.S. Jaswal because he oversaw Army operations in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and an Indian newspaper reported on Saturday 28th August that India had responded by suspending military exchanges. Chinese media sources have said they are unaware of any change in relations, and the Indian government has refused to comment.

The Indian Ocean's role as a key shipping route is only going to increase as the Chinese spread their investing power around the world. How India react to China's actions could be of crucial importance to not only the region, but the world.
Sources: Yahoo news, The Irrawaddy, The Bangkok Post

China, Japan hold treaty talks on gas exploration rights in the East China Sea

Japan and China held the first round of talks in Tokyo on 27th July aimed at signing a treaty over joint gas field development in the East China Sea. The two sides had agreed to hold gas treaty talks when officials met in Hanoi last week as part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meetings.

Akitaka Saiki, director general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian and Ocean Affairs Bureau, and Ning Fukui, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Boundary and Ocean Affairs Department, attended the meeting to discuss the treaty, which is expected to reflect a 2008 bilateral accord.

The accord was designed to resolve a row over gas exploration, and the two countries agreed to drill jointly for oil and gas in the north of the East China Sea. The two countries agreed to jointly tap an area near the gas field known as Longjing in China and Asunaro in Japan; Japan would also invest in the development of the Shirakaba gas field, known as Chunxiao in China.

Talks between the two nations since the June 2008 agreement have been stalled however, with Japan accusing China of beginning unilateral operations of the Chinese side of the median line.

The dispute over ownership of the area originated when it was discovered that part of an undersea natural gas field lay within the Chinese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but part of it lay within a disputed EEZ between Japan and China.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China claims the disputed ocean territory as its own EEZ, due to it being part of the PRC’s natural extension of its continental shelf. Japan, however, claims the disputed territory because it is within 200 nautical miles of Japan’s coast.

The Chunxiao gas field established by China in 2003 is clearly within the Chinese side of the EEZ boundary, but Japan argues that they may tap into a field that stretches into the disputed area.

The 2008 agreement was meant to settle the dispute, and the renewed talks appear to be a positive sign. Additionally, in Hanoi, both states’ foreign ministers expressed their satisfaction at the state of China-Japan relations.

Sources: The Mainichi Daily News, Zee News

For the full text of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, please see the menas borders eLibrary

China, Vietnam reach border agreement

Thanh Thuy Border Gate

Three bilateral agreements on borders and landmarks between Vietnam and China took effect on Wednesday 14th July, eight months after they were signed. The accords include a Protocol on Border Demarcation and Marker Planting, an Agreement on Border Management Regulations and an Agreement on Border Gates and Border Management Regulations.

Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son said "These legal documents have officially ended a 36-year land border settlement process between Viet Nam and China," during a ceremony to honour the agreements at the Thanh Thuy border gate between Vietnamese province Ha Giang and Chinese province Yunnan.

Vietnam and China share a 1,450km-long border, including 384,000km of rivers and streams. On 27th December 2001, the first border marker was installed at the Mong Cai border post between Vietnam and Dongxing, China, following a 1999 treaty on land borders between the two countries. By 31st December, 2008 the border demarcation was declared complete; in total 1971 marker posts had been installed, including one that accords with a Vietnam-Laos-China agreement.

The history of conflict between China and Vietnam predates Western interference. Vietnam was a tributary of the China’s Qing dynasty, until the French invaded in 1858, and by the 1890s Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were all French colonies. The Japanese occupied Vietnam during the Second World War after which the Viet Minh fought the French for Vietnam’s independence. China was involved with both sides: Mao Zedong's communist CCP backed the Viet Minh, while Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang nationalists whom the Communists eventually defeated in 1949, backed the French restoration. After the decisive 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu, when the French were comprehensively defeated by the Viet Minh, they quickly left Vietnam and the July 1954 Geneva Accords divided the country into North and South Vietnam.

Throughout the second Vietnam War which began in 1959 between the Viet Minh and the US backed South Vietnamese, both the Chinese and the Soviet Union supported the North, despite the fact that relations between the Chinese and Soviets had soured since the late 1950s. The North Vietnamese drifted towards the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s, and relations deteriorated between Vietnam and China further in the 1970s, especially as the latter reoriented its foreign policy towards the USA.

Conflict broke out between the two countries in 1979 over Vietnam’s role in Cambodia. Vietnam had invaded Cambodia in late 1978 in order to remove the virulently anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge, who were demanding land from Vietnam and massacring ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. China was supporting the Khmer Rouge and therefore invaded North Vietnam in February 1979 in an effort to force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, although the official explanation had more to do with the disputed Spratly Islands. The Chinese forces got as far as Hanoi before withdrawing, conducting a ‘scorched-earth’ campaign in the north on their way out, but both countries claimed victory because Vietnam was not forced to alter its plans in Cambodia.

Border skirmishes continued through the 1980s and a naval conflict occurred in 1988 over the Spratly Islands. The conflict ended in 1989, when Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, but it took another 10 years before a treaty was signed designating a border, which remained secret.

The ceremony on 14th July 2010 marked the culmination of moves towards cooperation, and the two countries have agreed to establish a Vietnam-China Joint Committee on Land Border to manage the border. The construction of a highway between Vietnam’s capital of Hanoi and Kunming, which is the capital of Yunnan province, is underway.

The ownership of the hundreds of Spratly Islands and other parts of the South China Sea is still disputed between Vietnam, China, and other countries in the region. While the islands themselves are uninhabited, it is thought that the region may contain large reserves of oil and gas although this has not yet been proven.

Sources: Asia News Network, Thanh Nien News