Banda rules out Malawi-Tanzania deal

Malawi President Joyce Banda has ruled out the possibility of an interim deal with Tanzania over their disputed border that runs through Lake Malawi. “ Malawi's position is that we own the entire lake, except for a portion ceded to Mozambique in 1954 for mutually beneficial reasons. The law clearly supports that position," said Banda on 14 July, suggesting also that the issue would be brought to the International Court of Justice if a resolution was not reached by September.

The announcement came in a press conference following talks with the former presidents of Mozambique and South Africa, Joachim Chissanoand Thabo Mbeki, who were on an official visit to Lilongwe to help mediate between both parties. Chissano, who now heads the Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) Forum of Former Heads of State and Government, which has been an active player in the five decade old dispute since the case was referred to it earlier this year, pledged his team would present Malawi's concerns to Tanzania and aim to reach an agreement within three months.

Malawi claims the majority of Lake Malawi, Africa's third-largest lake, according to a colonial-era document, the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty, while Tanzania insists that the lake should be shared equitably between them, based on the guidelines on maritime boundaries set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Tensions have risen after Malawi awarded a contract to Britain's Surestream Petroleum last year to prospect for oil in the Lake near the Tanzanian coast. The region is believed to be extremely rich in natural gas and oil.

ICJ files initial dates for Bolivia-Chile dispute

The ICJ this week fixed time-limits for the filing of initial pleadings in the case concerning 'Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean' between Bolivia and Chile. The Plurinational State of Bolivia, who initiated proceedings, must file a Memorial by 17 April 2014, and the Republic of Bolivia must follow this pleading by filing its Counter-Memorial by 18 February 2015. The filing of Memorials and Counter-Memorials is standard practise in the Hague, to outline the initial positions of both parties, however, no decision has been made by the court regarding what subsequent procedures may follow.

On 24 April Bolivia instituted proceedings in the ICJ against Chile to reclaim sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean: territory that it lost in the 19^thcentury War of the Pacific. Chilean President Sebastian Pinera has responded by rejecting talks, asking the ICJ to dismiss Bolivia's application, as he believes it threatens to open a “Pandora's Box” of international border disputes.

The 400km strip of coastal territory was annexed by Chile in the 1904 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, following the five-year conflict over mining rights. Hostilities between the neighbours have lingered since then, with repeated attempts to renegotiate the border failing. Bolivia, which still maintains a small navy and celebrates the Day of the Sea each year to honour its once substantial maritime territory, maintains that the 1904 Treaty is void, as it was signed under coercion from Chile. Authorities in Santiago however remain steadfast in opposing Bolivia's claim, with diplomatic ties not being re-established since they were broken off in 1978.

A new 'flashpoint'? The Israel-Lebanon maritime border dispute

Overview

At first glance, a new flashpoint in the Middle East appears to be emerging in the form of the disputed maritime border between Israel and Lebanon. The states have not successfully formalised their maritime borders, and this has become problematic with the discovery of natural gas reserves in the Levantine Basin. The discovery of the Tamar and Leviathan fields has prompted speculation that other, similar discoveries stand to be made along the coastline of the eastern Mediterranean. This suggests the increasing criticality of precisely delimited maritime boundaries between the states' exclusive economic zones (EEZs), within which they exclusive rights over natural resource exploitation.

Four hundred and thirty square miles are contested in the present dispute which is made further problematic by the diplomatic relations between the state parties: Lebanon, for example, does not recognise Israel and has left the matter open for resolution by the UN. The UN has said that it cannot take any such action on the basis that the delineation of the maritime boundary between the states is no part of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate. For its part, Israel includes the maritime boundary as but one aspect of the generalised political crisis that it says characterises the entire maritime and land border that separates it from Lebanon. The other major player, the US, has appeared to support the Lebanese position for instrumental reasons, and its representative has sought to depoliticise the current crisis, and frame it in technical and legal terms.

It would seem that the US is on its own, at least in this respect. Media reports have speculated on the potential for a repeat of the war fought between Israel and Lebanon five years ago, with the maritime border as the new, critical factor. But while the dispute may be overtly political it seems that risks of a new confrontation are being exaggerated. Moreover, it may also be that the position adopted by the US with respect to its ally, Israel, is not as unusual as it may first appear; rather, it is the continuation of policy through more nuanced means.

The nature of the dispute

In August 2010 the Lebanese government submitted a map to the UN which, through the use of a border line, defined the extent of its EEZ. This line is to the south of the equivalent line proposed by Israel on 10 July 2011, but its position has been endorsed by the US government. Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel has argued that the Lebanese line contradicts both the lines that both Lebanon and Israel have agreed with Cyprus in, respectively, 2007 and 2010, on the western extents of their EEZs.

In international law, the principle of acquiescence suggests that a right to a claim may be lost if a party remains silent when a unilateral move, i.e. the claim to territory articulated by the Lebanese submission of a map, is made. It was for this reason that the Israeli cabinet approved its own border delimitation during the last week. Lebanon's response has been to signal its commitment to protecting the 2010 borders. The hydrocarbon reserves enclosed by the limits of these overlapping claims are those at the centre of the present dispute. Energy analysts have discussed how Israeli control of them would make Israel a gas-exporting state whereas, at present, its supply is under threat of disruption, the pipeline from Egypt having been repeatedly bombed in recent months.

Elements within the Israeli government have argued that protestations to the Israeli line are made by elements within Lebanon, principally Hezbollah, intent on provoking a conflict. This, to Israeli officials, may represent a maritime Shebaa Farms—the area of territory that Hezbollah has long accused Israel of occupying illegally, but claimed, by Israel, as a part of the Golan Heights—and, thereby, offer the pretext to a conflict. As in the case of the Shebaa Farms, their policy view is that the territory is legitimately held, and that the existence of the dispute and the competing claims presents little more than a rationale for a confrontation provoked by the hostile powers that surround Israel. Indeed, a position used by Israeli politicians is that the present dispute is symptomatic of a relationship with Lebanon, in which elements within the country will seek to thwart everything that Israel seeks to do.

The Lebanese government's position has been that Israel has violated international law, and Lebanese sovereignty, in coming to the 2010 agreement with Cyprus. In January 2011 the Lebanese Foreign Minister wrote to the UN Secretary-General to ask that the UN work to prevent Israeli exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves in within the EEZ determined in the maps submitted by his ministry in August 2010. The Energy Minister, Gebran Bassil, has said that the government plans to auction off concessions in 2012; before then he has said that Lebanon will seek to counter Israel's continuing aggression and retaliate through political and diplomatic means.

The position of the US, and of the senior US diplomat in charge of the Israel-Lebanon brief, Frederic Hof, has been to ensure that the dispute cannot become the pretext for conflict that the Israeli government anticipates. Hof has sought to ameliorate tension through the appearance of appeasement, if not appeasement outright. The US, after all, has a number of private commercial interests within this context; companies are involved in exploratory and research activities in the Levantine Basin. Hof has appeared to back, at least in part, the Lebanese line, and has suggested that Israel submit the dispute to the UN, and indirectly negotiate with Lebanon through this channel, given the non-recognition problem. (Israel has, of course, refused this option and called upon Lebanon to negotiate all of the current border issues, both on land and at sea.) Its commercial interests considered—and its future access to the reserves in question—it is in US interests to adopt a policy that does not automatically privilege its longstanding regional ally in the Middle East. The US has recognised the danger of the pretext in the specific setting and played its hand accordingly; it will back the Lebanese claim to avoid a Shebaa Farms situation at sea and protect the interests of American firms and investors.

The way ahead

Perhaps this apparent marginalisation of Israel by the US makes more sense than at first it might appear. Granted, the commercial interests are important, but two other concerns should also be considered: Israel's energy security (and recognition of the potential disruption of the gas supply to Israel, and the increase in prices that this would dictate); and the actual scale of the natural resource reserves in the disputed area. A third factor, the likelihood of a new conflict, five years on from the border war, is also debatable despite the line peddled by news sources.

The disruption inflicted by recent attacks upon the gas pipeline between Egypt and Israel have shown that attacks on Israeli gas facilities will not be borne lightly. In this sense the US and Israel can work together: Israel can perform a display of jealously guarding its sovereignty, while its more powerful ally can adopt a pragmatic, conciliatory line, and support the Lebanese claim. This may reduce the potential for gas supply disruption to Israel given that the justification for Hezbollah sabotage could evaporate; the US conciliates so that Israel does not have to appear to stoop so low.

With respect to the scale of the deposits in the disputed area, it may be that the problem is being inflated quite falsely. According to one source, the border route that follows the Lebanese course affects only the northern parts of the Alon and Ruth licences which, although they may contain smaller oil and gas deposits, are not the prime concerns of Noble Energy and Delek, the firms that own the licences. Their primary interests are situated further south. If this view is correct then the major consequence of adopting the Lebanese maritime line would only be to delay—and by no means permanently forestall—the development of the less consequential Alon and Ruth licences.

Hof has attempted to frame the dispute in technical and economic terms and to ensure that it does not become a political matter. Perhaps this is in line with an overall US strategy, concerned with protecting Israel but, moreover, with appeasing Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Put simply, perhaps the stakes are not as high, and maybe Israel is not conceding as much, as the US and Israel might like it to appear at first sight.

In any case, as Eyal Zisser of Tel Aviv University has argued, a conflict between Israel and Lebanon is unlikely. Both sides have a great deal to lose. Rocket attacks on Israel, and the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure would be the consequences, and the 2006 war is still a memory fresh enough to provide a measure of deterrence. Supporting the Lebanese interpretation of the maritime boundary therefore provides the US with a route to protect the Israeli energy supply, articulate a show of its own strength (and independence from Israel), at cost (in resource terms) that is lower than it seems.

Sources: Al Arabiya, Bloomberg, The Financial Times, Haaretz, The Independent, Jerusalem Post, Jewish Week, New Zealand Herald

For more information, please see the Menas Borders website, here.

Google Maps: Virtual Land Grabs and ‘Google Recognition’

Considering the Ilemi Triangle for two previous Menas Borders pieces, it was interesting to note its treatment in Google Maps (Map 1). Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan all make territorial claims to the Triangle while Kenya is the state that polices and de facto administers the territory. This notwithstanding, it is important to note that there has never been any cession of territory by the state with the recognised de jure territorial claim, Sudan.

Map 1: The Ilemi Triangle at http://maps.google.co.uk/ – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Google’s treatment of Ilemi is perhaps indicative of its responses to the problems represented by the ‘symbology’ of territorial borders. (As noted in a Google blog, border position and image resolution are two other problematic areas.) Google argues that it has attempted to address the qualitative aspects of positional and territorial disputes and that its concern with symbology involves the recognition that territorial disputes and settlements do not represent any static horizon. Their evolution, it is argued, means that Google has to use a degree of nuance in its depiction of territorial borders and employ several methods to denote the uncertainty and conflict that surrounds the site, and even mere existence, of many territorial borders.

The current line used in Google Maps to denote the northern extent of Ilemi is seemingly based on the 1938 Wakefield Line. Wakefield is a revision of the 1931 Red Line that was never intended to delimit an international boundary. Indeed, the sole official boundary, recognised in 1914, is that surveyed by Captain Maud’s expedition in 1902. So the function of Wakefield was to show the extent of Kenyan administration upon the territory of colonial Sudan, its condominium government having afforded its Kenyan counterpart a ‘right of hot pursuit’ across the international boundary in 1928.

For its part, the 1938 extension of Wakefield was drawn in order to accommodate more adequately the transhumant grazing patterns of the Turkana people. This extension has, of course, suited Kenyan interests well and has provided the basis for the claim that is still exercised by Kenyan governments. However, as far as I can tell, no Kenyan government has made any application, to any authority, for a formal transfer of territory other than in 1967. At this point, after independence, Kenyatta’s government sought British intervention in support of the cession of the Triangle to Kenya. For a variety of reasons—perhaps because of the waning British influence, or maybe the formulation of the 1964 OAU declaration on the sacrosanctity of territorial borders (itself consistently flouted by Kenya in its practice on Ilemi)—nothing came of this. Since, other pressures—most obviously a number of armed conflicts—have meant that the matter remains unresolved and the de facto control of the Triangle territory preserved, however informally. But by excluding the 1914 Line Google Maps ‘silences’ the only internationally recognised boundary. In so doing it reinforces the tenuous Kenyan claim to the Triangle and the Red/Wakefield Line as an international boundary which it is certainly not. Google Maps in effect performs its own geopolitical action by silencing Maud’s line and performing a virtual territorial grab on the part of Kenya.

So how far has Google Maps come to represent a proxy for international recognition of a border? It could not be argued that ‘Google recognition’ has arrived to supplant the mechanisms of public international law since Google Maps’ launch in 2005 and yet Google Maps does serve to reinforce particular interests. It does so through perhaps nothing more than the sources of its data (including, for example, the US State Department). Particular cartographies serve particular policies, privileged interests and parties to alliances; so the Google Maps data cannot be regarded as authoritative or impartial statements on the authentic positionality of territorial borders. It can do little more than privilege the interpretation of the source which, if needs be, is to the cost of international law. (The positions adopted by the US toward Kenya and Sudan might prove instructive in this sense, but there is no space for consideration of that here.) The point is, then, that the Google Maps is a powerful tool which, given its accessibility, has the capacity to gain a measure of seeming-legitimacy and penetrate the geopolitical imaginations of those who, in the best of faith, consume its depictions of space. On this view Google has a responsibility that must extend further than simply tailoring the depiction of particular disputed borders according to the location of an IP address.

Perhaps this is to overstate the case. Nonetheless, it is to show that supposed objectivity counts for little and that uncertainty over a territorial disposition counts for far more when it is only partially reproduced in Google’s software. Indeed, it is a testament to the legitimacy that Google Maps now seems to bestow upon these dispositions that governments are seemingly prepared to act militarily where and when a virtual territorial grab may be construed as threatening the interests of states. One such example is in the recent Nicaraguan incursion into Costa Rican territory (October 2010), although this orthodox interpretation arguably neglects the background to the incident: the commander of the Nicaraguan military unit perhaps refers to Google Maps to explain a Nicaraguan mistake rather than truly stake a claim to territory. Indeed, Google admitted to a mistake, blaming incorrect data supplied by the US State Department; perhaps there is the risk of unfairly vilifying Google in this case. Nonetheless the dispute still escalated, the Nicaraguans subsequently claiming, in something of an about-turn, the validity of the Google map. The ICJ ruling that put a formal end to the territorial dispute in 2009 relied heavily on the Canas-Jerez Treaty (1858) which, especially in an era of sophisticated mapping and cartographic technologies, can only contain manifold ambiguities and inspire a variety of competing interpretations. Perhaps Google’s failing—which is only the equivalent of that of any archival hermeneut of treaties and the associated geographical information—is that it cannot itself act as the arbiter of objectivity, truth and coherence, a status to which it is perhaps popularly elevated by consequence of its accessibility and ready availability. So perhaps the important question is how the Google Maps interpretation—which, Google having parted ways from its private partner, Tele Atlas, is derived from government data sources—has become the dominant interpretation.

This month Tajikistan’s lower house of parliament ratified a border agreement with China. This must still be ratified by the Tajik Senate but the agreement would end a dispute that dates back to the nineteenth century and result in a significant transfer of territory (1,000 sq km to China and 27,500 sq km to Tajikistan). Controversy surrounds the agreement and its ratification: rumours have circulated as to the extent of the territorial transfer, parliamentary deputies have claimed to have been unaware of the agreement (made in 2002) until the last few weeks, others have claimed that any transfer represents a violation of the Tajik constitution or a diplomatic defeat despite the limited proportion (c. 1%) of Tajik territory affected. Given this uncertainty perhaps it is fortunate that Google, however inadvertently, has effectively hedged its bets (see Map 2). The data with which it has drawn its dotted, equivocal border is seemingly far vaguer in terms of image resolution than is the Bing Maps equivalent (Map 3). (Bing is Microsoft’s equivalent service which did, interestingly enough, have the Costa Rica-Nicaragua border in the usual location.)

Map 2: The China-Tajikistan border at http://maps.google.co.uk/ – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Map 3: The China-Tajikistan border at http://www.bing.com/maps/  – Retrieved 19 January 2011

Above all, therefore, it is perhaps only due to the considerable weight, high profile and accessibility of Google Maps that it has become the focus of ire over the last few years and as other services emerge to challenge its dominance the picture may only become more uncertain with the addition of different sources and interpretation. In the meantime, Google Maps must persevere in its concerns with symbology, positionality and image resolution in order to address the contingency and dynamism of the territorial dispositions that it has chosen to relay. We should also be wary of parties using the ambiguities of these maps, vilifying Google and its sources in the process, in justifying their actions, and journalistic sources jumping on the bandwagon in speaking of ‘21^st Century War’.

Visitors to Cambodia's Preah Vihear temple increase sharply in 2010

Tourists visiting Cambodia's Preah Vihear temple increased by almost four fold in 2010 thanks to good security and better infrastructure in the area, director of Preah Vihear province's tourism department Kong Vibol said on Saturday 1st January.

80,356 people visited the temple in 2010, up from 17,174 people in 2009, he told Chinese media source Xinhua by telephone. Of the figures, the domestic visitors were up 3.7 times to 78,419 from 16,405 and the foreign tourists increased by 1.5 times to 1,937 from 769.

"It's a huge increase of the tourists to the temple in 2010 due to better security and stability as the border tension with Thailand has been eased, and the good condition roads--easy to travel,"said Kong Vibol, adding "so visitors feel safe and more confidence to visit the temple."

Thailand and Cambodia had both claimed the eleventh century Hindu temple historically until it was awarded to Cambodia by the ICJ in 1962, based on a 1907 colonial era map. Thailand had been hoping to have the temple jointly listed by UNESCO, but in July 2008, it was enlisted as a World Heritage Site under Cambodian jurisdiction. Soon after a border conflict broke out over claims to the 1.8 square miles at the base of the temple that were not ruled on in 1962. Periodic clashes have broken out since and the border area in the region is heavily militarised. Thailand threatened to withdraw from UNESCO in July 2010 over Cambodia's new land management plans, and UNESCO's decided to put off deciding on the plans until 2011.

Keen to avoid violence, both sides have dedicated themselves to finding a diplomatic solution and the prime ministers of each country have met four times since September.

Given the uncertainty that surrounded the temple throughout July and August, it is perhaps surprising that the temple's tourist numbers were so strong. Perhaps the renewed attention the temple recieved as a result of the conflict boosted domestic tourist numbers as part of a show of nationalism and loyalty.

Thai access to the temple was blocked off as of June 2010, therefore the number of Thai tourists this year was likely to be very limited. In December 2010 however, Cambodia announced that they would reopen the border in the new year, thereby paving the way for increased numbers of Thai tourists in 2011.

In 2010, Preah Vihear province as a whole received 135,657 tourists, up 119 percent from 61,903 in 2009, Kong Vibol said. Of the figure, foreign tourists were up 32 percent to 11,249 from 8,512 in 2009.

Preah Vihear province has three ancient temples for tourists. They are Preah Vihear temple, Koh Ker temple and Preah Khan Kampong Svay temple.

Source: Xinhua

For more information on Thailand and Cambodia's dispute over the Preah Vihear temple, please see the menas borders website, here.

Border Focus: Eritrea and Djibouti

What is disputed?

At the centre of the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti is a tiny strip of land at their border. The greater Horn of Africa region, however, has numerous border disputes.

What is the history of the dispute?

The accepted border is a result of a 1900 boundary agreement between colonial powers France (French Somaliland, now Djibouti) and Italy (Eritrea). They agreed that the international boundary starts at Cape Doumeira (Ras Doumeira) at the Red Sea and runs for 1.5km along the watershed devide of the peninsula. The 1900 protocol also specified that the Doumeira Island (Ile Doumeira), which lies just offshore, would not be assigned sovereignty and would remain demilitarised.

The border at Ras Doumeira was, however, never demarcated. The area itself is a hill, and it was simply agreed that the northern slopes of hill were Italian, the southern slopes, French. Upon independence, Eritrea and Djibouti accepted this arrangement.

The first major post-colonial dispute arose when, in April 1996, a Djibouti official accused Eritrea of shelling Ras Doumeira, and the two countries narrowly avoided going to war.
Problems arose again in 2008, when the Eritreans occupied the hilltop. The circumstances surrounding this event are somewhat disputed. Djiboutian sources report that in January, Eritrea requested to cross the border in order to get sand for a road, but instead occupied the territory, set up fortifications and dug trenches on both sides of the Djiboutian border. Djibouti also claimed that Eritrea had put out new maps showing Ras Doumeira as Eritrean territory.

Eritrean sources, however, note that Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, met twice with Djiboutian officials, informing them that his country intended to build a demarcation on Ras Doumeira hill. It was not clear why Eritrea wanted to build such a demarcation, but it has been speculated that it might be connected to boundary disputes it has with other neighbours, including Ethiopia, Yemen and Somalia. It might also reflect Eritrea's discomfort with the presence of American and French bases in Djibouti; the main American base, 'Seven Sea' is less than 10km south of the hill.

Both sides fortified the hill and manned it with military personnel, and clashes between the two sides broke out in June 2008. Despite the military might of Eritrea, Djibouti's backing by the majority of the international community, including former colonial master France, meant that it was able to withhold the Eritrean forces. Still, 35 people died in the clashes and dozens of others were wounded.

After Djibouti requested UN intervention, a UN fact-finding mission was sent to the region. It was welcomed by Djibouti, but blocked by Eritrea, who refused to meet with it or with any envoy of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

In January 2009, the UN Security council adopted Resolution 1862, which demanded that Eritrea pulled its forces from the disputed area, and welcomed Djibouti's withdrawal of its forces to its positions before the dispute. A further resolution, 1907, imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea, admonishing the country for its lack of progress on resolving the border dispute with Djibouti, and for arming Somali insurgents such as Al-Shabaab.

Resolution options?

In June 2010, the two countries agreed to a Qatar-led mediation process, a move that was warmly welcomed by the African Union and the UN, although Ethiopia questioned Eritrea's sincerity.

The fact that Eritrea agreed to Qatar's mediation effort is a positive sign that it wants to reintegrate into the world community. Eritrean President Afewerki was instrumental in starting the talks, and 2010 has seen him striking more conciliatory tones towards neighbours.

In September 2010, Isaias welcomed UN special representative for Somalia to Asmara for talks, and voiced his full support for a peaceful solution to Somalia's problems. Eritrea has also tried to forge friendships with Qatar, Iran, Israel and Egypt.

Eritrea is on the brink of a potentially lucrative gold mining boom, and seems to be worried about being isolated. Ethiopia used to use Eritrean ports for Red Sea access, but in recent years has preferred Djibouti. The potential revenues from shipping could be another incentive to improve its global reputation.

For more information on this dispute, including consideration of the regional context, see the full Border Focus, here.

China, Vietnam reach border agreement

Thanh Thuy Border Gate

Three bilateral agreements on borders and landmarks between Vietnam and China took effect on Wednesday 14th July, eight months after they were signed. The accords include a Protocol on Border Demarcation and Marker Planting, an Agreement on Border Management Regulations and an Agreement on Border Gates and Border Management Regulations.

Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son said "These legal documents have officially ended a 36-year land border settlement process between Viet Nam and China," during a ceremony to honour the agreements at the Thanh Thuy border gate between Vietnamese province Ha Giang and Chinese province Yunnan.

Vietnam and China share a 1,450km-long border, including 384,000km of rivers and streams. On 27th December 2001, the first border marker was installed at the Mong Cai border post between Vietnam and Dongxing, China, following a 1999 treaty on land borders between the two countries. By 31st December, 2008 the border demarcation was declared complete; in total 1971 marker posts had been installed, including one that accords with a Vietnam-Laos-China agreement.

The history of conflict between China and Vietnam predates Western interference. Vietnam was a tributary of the China’s Qing dynasty, until the French invaded in 1858, and by the 1890s Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were all French colonies. The Japanese occupied Vietnam during the Second World War after which the Viet Minh fought the French for Vietnam’s independence. China was involved with both sides: Mao Zedong's communist CCP backed the Viet Minh, while Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang nationalists whom the Communists eventually defeated in 1949, backed the French restoration. After the decisive 1954 battle of Dien Bien Phu, when the French were comprehensively defeated by the Viet Minh, they quickly left Vietnam and the July 1954 Geneva Accords divided the country into North and South Vietnam.

Throughout the second Vietnam War which began in 1959 between the Viet Minh and the US backed South Vietnamese, both the Chinese and the Soviet Union supported the North, despite the fact that relations between the Chinese and Soviets had soured since the late 1950s. The North Vietnamese drifted towards the Soviet Union throughout the 1960s, and relations deteriorated between Vietnam and China further in the 1970s, especially as the latter reoriented its foreign policy towards the USA.

Conflict broke out between the two countries in 1979 over Vietnam’s role in Cambodia. Vietnam had invaded Cambodia in late 1978 in order to remove the virulently anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge, who were demanding land from Vietnam and massacring ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia. China was supporting the Khmer Rouge and therefore invaded North Vietnam in February 1979 in an effort to force Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, although the official explanation had more to do with the disputed Spratly Islands. The Chinese forces got as far as Hanoi before withdrawing, conducting a ‘scorched-earth’ campaign in the north on their way out, but both countries claimed victory because Vietnam was not forced to alter its plans in Cambodia.

Border skirmishes continued through the 1980s and a naval conflict occurred in 1988 over the Spratly Islands. The conflict ended in 1989, when Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, but it took another 10 years before a treaty was signed designating a border, which remained secret.

The ceremony on 14th July 2010 marked the culmination of moves towards cooperation, and the two countries have agreed to establish a Vietnam-China Joint Committee on Land Border to manage the border. The construction of a highway between Vietnam’s capital of Hanoi and Kunming, which is the capital of Yunnan province, is underway.

The ownership of the hundreds of Spratly Islands and other parts of the South China Sea is still disputed between Vietnam, China, and other countries in the region. While the islands themselves are uninhabited, it is thought that the region may contain large reserves of oil and gas although this has not yet been proven.

Sources: Asia News Network, Thanh Nien News